Is anticipatory action the future of aid or an expensive gamble?

Setting the Scene

In Turkana, Kenya, the International Rescue Committee (IRC) spent six months preparing for a disaster that never came.

The eight-person team assessed feasibility and need, registered 1,300 households and monitored government forecasts for a drought or flood indicator that would trigger the release of funds to each household.

Photo of rural area in Kenya
Water containers near RukRuk village in Turkana, Kenya, during the 2022 drought. © The International Rescue Committee/Patrick Meinhardt for the IRC

But the threshold was never met, so no cash went out. On paper, the program did nothing, and cost roughly $112,000.

So Was That a Waste or a Worthwhile Premium for the Option to Act?

That question sits on top of a much bigger one. According to ALNAP, humanitarian actors moved an estimated $7 billion in cash and vouchers in 2025, roughly a fifth of all humanitarian aid. Very little is distributed before a shock — less than half a percent of humanitarian sector funding in any form1 is anticipatory.

Is waiting for a crisis to act the right choice? Maybe not. Crises are growing larger and more frequent, especially those driven by climate, while funding for humanitarian response continues to shrink.

chart of global humanitarian funding by year
Global humanitarian funding has declined in recent years.

In this environment, any way to stretch limited funding is valuable. The sector’s own answer is to act earlier to stretch money further. Supplies cost less to buy and move before a shock, and families can prepare for it rather than go into debt or sell off assets to cope. Had Turkana’s trigger fired, 1,300 households would have received cash while there was still time to buy additional food or take preventative measures to protect themselves and their livelihoods. In 2024, a negotiating group of donors and aid agencies called on donors to target at least 5% of their humanitarian budgets for acting ahead of shocks, a goal that largely2 has yet to be achieved.

Shrinking funding may be what finally forces the rethink.

Humanitarian System Reform: A History

Against today’s backdrop, we think adopting new approaches to make the most of limited money should be a priority.

One of these approaches is anticipatory action — what the Turkana program was building. Anticipatory action expands on disaster risk reduction and early warning system developments dating back to the 1970s and was further inspired by World Bank insurance model innovations of the early 2000s.

Of course, the underlying idea of reading signs of a coming shock and acting in advance predates structured humanitarian aid. Kagunyu et al. note that pastoralist communities in Kenya’s drylands have long anticipated floods and droughts through their own early warning systems: animal behavior, flowering plants, cloud patterns.3 These communities prepare for the coming shock, but their ability to prepare is limited by their own resources.

Humanitarian actors have far more resources. However, they have rarely turned early warnings into action. For example, forecasters issued “increasingly dire” warnings for 11 months before famine was officially declared in Somalia by the United Nations in July 2011. The international response largely failed to mobilize until after that declaration. According to the UN, this delay contributed to the famine’s death toll of nearly 260,000 people, half of them children under five years old.

Timeline of warnings of famine in Somalia
In Somalia, warnings started long before famine declaration.

Anticipatory action tries to avoid this delay. Rather than wait for a disaster to strike before mobilizing relief, anticipatory action ensures resources reach households in advance of a shock. This is often triggered by a forecast crossing an agreed-upon threshold — for instance, a weather forecast showing a certain likelihood of flooding.

Photo of flooded town in Somalia
Floodwaters rushed through a town in Somalia in November 2023, after heavy Deyr rains followed years of drought. © The International Rescue Committee/A. Kahiye for the IRC

In practice, anticipatory action programs can vary a lot. A program can be lean and only begin investing in resources once a long-range forecast flags a likely hazard — or it can be something that requires much more investment and creates standing protocols and systems.

Across designs, though, anticipatory action changes both what a response costs and what benefits it delivers.

Anticipatory action has costs that traditional aid programs do not. Building and maintaining forecasts, triggers and delivery systems are real costs. But anticipatory programs allow households to buy and move supplies before prices spike and access is cut off. A Start Network rapid evidence assessment finds that early action can be cheaper than reactive aid for this reason.

Benefits can be significant. When families receive cash before a crisis, they can react better. They can move themselves and their families away from a natural disaster before it hits, prepare for a storm or flooding or buy what they need before prices climb. This can help families protect their livelihoods and keep the assets they would otherwise sell to survive. But a “wrong” forecast, where the trigger activates but the hazard never arrives, can mean anticipatory action pays out to non-impacted households. This can be seen as a waste of money and is not a problem in traditional humanitarian response, where transfers wait for confirmed need.

Anticipatory Action: The Evidence, As We Know It

There are some circumstances where anticipatory action is helpful and some where it is not. Unfortunately, the debate on anticipatory action is decidedly less nuanced than it should be. Depending on whom you ask, anticipatory action represents either the future of aid or an expensive gamble. Proponents see a smarter, faster and more dignified model. Skeptics see money wasted paying out on forecasts that don’t come to pass — or, as in Turkana, programs that have been set up but never trigger.4

According to the Anticipation Hub, anticipatory action activations roughly tripled from 2022 to 2025, reaching over 9 million people across 54 countries last year. But despite being around for over a decade, research exploring the cost-effectiveness of anticipatory action continues to lag. The IRC has been working to close that learning gap.

Since 2021, we have implemented anticipatory action programs in eight countries.5 We’ve conducted cost and impact analyses to answer questions such as whether delivering cash as one lump sum protects households better than two half-sized payments and whether giving cash before a flood hits protects households better than giving it after.

Though there is still much to learn, these programs and evaluations helped us develop much-needed heuristics to understand whether and how anticipatory action can maximize humanitarian cost-effectiveness.

1. Context determines what anticipatory action can do, not just how well.

A Mercy Corps synthesis argues that anticipatory action can serve two different purposes: (1) act as earlier aid, providing the same welfare gains as post-shock assistance and (2) let households protect productive assets and livelihoods before a shock closes off options.6

There can be limits to that second option, though. We conducted the first-ever randomized controlled trial of anticipatory action cash transfers in Afghanistan in drought-plagued Badghis Province in 2025. The IRC randomized whether households received a single cash transfer before the harvest season or two smaller transfers (with the same overall amount), one before and one after. All families in the program were suffering; a trifecta of near-total harvest failure, cross-border restrictions that cut off seasonal earnings and sudden withdrawal of humanitarian funding left households with almost nothing to fall back on. By endline, around 94% of households that received a cash transfer reported no income at all. 

A man carries water in a desert landscape
A man carries water across a dry riverbed in Badghis Province, Afghanistan, in 2023. © The International Rescue Committee/Mahab Azizi for the IRC

The cash was a lifeline. It helped families meet some of their immediate needs and avoid new debt; for many, it was the first assistance they’d received in roughly a year. Delivering the transfer as a single payment (before the shock) generally left families relatively better off than splitting it in two, but the average household in both treatment arms began and ended the study as “food insecure.”7 Anticipatory action could help blunt the impact of a shock, but it could not  restart the wider economy and restore incomes. In a context this fragile, anticipatory action can be but one component of recovery.

The IRC was not alone in finding this — a qualitative Save the Children study across drought-impacted areas of Kenya and Somaliland also indicates that livelihood-protecting anticipatory action is unlikely to be enough on its own in a protracted crisis. For this reason, the study recommends layering anticipatory action with conventional humanitarian aid for the hardest-hit households.

2. The cheapest anticipatory action system is the one you don’t build from scratch. 

Anticipatory action relies on forecasts and the ability to move money fast. These systems can be very costly to build but cheap to reuse.

In Somalia, we layered our program onto resilience and early-warning systems already in place.8 As a result, setting up the program cost roughly $52 per household and took three months. It would have cost an estimated $2889 per household to build the same capability from scratch. We estimate that use of preexisting systems lowered the set-up costs from 28% of total program cost to 7%.

Chart of setup costs for anticipatory action
Reusing existing systems reduces setup costs.

We were certainly not the first to work with existing systems. When the World Food Programme delivered forecast-triggered cash ahead of Bangladesh’s 2020 monsoon, it relied on widely used mobile money channels; during Nepal’s 2021 floods, the Nepal Red Cross Society routed cash through the government’s Social Security Allowance system. 

But our Somalia research program is among the few to quantify this reuse dividend, as well as to note that “working with existing systems” isn’t the same as “free.” Where a system already exists like in Somalia, this can be a powerful model. 

When systems don’t already exist, the sector defaults to a “build” and “fuel” model. Under this model, the humanitarian actor invests up front in standing up frameworks and triggers from scratch (“build”) then releases money to households (“fuel”) when a trigger fires. But for many organizations and contexts, an up-front investment can be hard to justify, difficult to finance10 and time-consuming to establish.11

A leaner approach, e.g., standing up a hazard-specific contingency plan once a long-range forecast flags a high-probability threat, may help12 stretch resources further and respond faster. 

This is what we did in Guatemala: free long-range forecasts from Columbia University’s climate institute flagged a high-probability flood season four months out; the open-source GloFAS flood platform pinpointed when to trigger; and cash and early-warning texts moved through a bank and a messaging platform we already worked with. The only thing newly built was our contingency plan, which spared us the cost of building our own trigger mechanism. 

3. Fast action runs on patient money. 

The two lessons above assume funding that (1) persists between shocks and (2) can move on a forecast. But the humanitarian system currently runs the other way around: it releases money once a loss has already occurred and been formally recognized (e.g., via a famine declaration or an emergency appeal). Under current rules, most humanitarian funding runs on an annual basis (or shorter) and is often tied to a donor fiscal year and specific geography. Many donors now say they want to act before a shock, yet the funding landscape does not reflect this. Some donors’ financial rules even prevent them from directly disbursing ahead of a shock at all.13

Increased use of two funding structures could help change this. Multiyear funding lets up-front investment pay off when spread across seasons: build once and activate across multiple forecasts. Pooled,14 flexible funding can do most of the rest: release money on a forecast, move as the forecast shifts and spread the risk of a trigger not firing across multiple seasons. Our German Federal Foreign Office funding spanned several countries, which let us work more probabilistically across them. When Turkana did not have a drought and the Kenya trigger didn’t fire, that money wasn’t “stuck” but could instead go where the need was.

Neither of these funding structures is new. The IRC’s own research on multiyear, flexible funding demonstrates how they lower administrative and cost burdens for both donors and implementers. Self-reporting indicates that in 2024, 14 of 22 donors gave more than 30% of their humanitarian funding as multiyear grants, up from 10 donors in 2023. 

Where We Go From Here

The team in Turkana prepared for a trigger that never came. As a standalone project, it can seem like money spent on nothing. But judged as a part of a system — one aimed where hazards recur, based on data and delivery systems that span seasons, and funded to act in advance — it looks like a premium on an insurance policy: one worth paying where hazards recur and hard to justify where they do not.

And even an unactivated trigger can leave something behind. In Turkana, we trained partners in household-economy analysis (a method for estimating what a given shock will cost a household and how much of it they can absorb) and tested new forecast methods. The experience helped reshape how we work, too — concentrating set-ups where forecasts are more likely to trigger.

The real question isn’t does anticipatory action work, but where it fits, what it’s built on and how it’s funded to last. If we get that right, anticipatory action could be one of the more promising innovations in the redesign of a multibillion-dollar humanitarian response system. Get it wrong, and it’s a multibillion-dollar bet that will never pay out.

The authors thank Clare Clingain and Mikaela Cochran-George for the research and analysis underpinning this article and Emily Barnes, Ben Excell, Miles Murray and Anneleen Vos for their technical review. Any errors are our own.

Justin Labeille is a Senior Director at the International Rescue Committee’s Airbel Impact Lab, where he leads the Best Use of Resources team. He previously directed cost-effectiveness evaluations at GiveWell and Giving Green, and held global research and policy roles at Living Goods, Innovations for Poverty Action, and J-PAL.

Paige Kirby is a Senior Advisor at the International Rescue Committee’s Airbel Impact Lab, where she works to change how funders use cost evidence. Previously, she led work on economic resilience and sovereign debt at USAID, managed foreign assistance budget execution, and worked in policy and applied research at Development Gateway and the OECD.

cartoon of a hare labeled fast response riding a tortoise with caption patient capital

If you have comments on this article, or wish to contribute to the discussion, please email them to letters@indevelopmentmag.com. Responses will be featured in a letters section.

  1. Anticipatory action spans modalities, including cash and in-kind aid, and covers response to a range of hazards, including climate, health and conflict-related shocks. In this article, we’ll primarily focus on cash transfers for climate-related shocks. ↩︎
  2. The main exception to this is Germany, a donor which has set (and met) its own quantitative 5% target. ↩︎
  3. From this, as Derbyshire et al. note, an open question remains whether anticipatory action’s data-driven triggers build on — or around — that knowledge. ↩︎
  4. Note that learnings from Turkana have informed an agile IRC approach that has been activated six of seven times. ↩︎
  5. Afghanistan, Chad, El Salvador, Guatemala, Iraq, Nigeria, Somalia and Kenya. ↩︎
  6. There is also early exploration into using anticipatory action to protect gains in other sectors, including education (see the Geneva Global Hub for Education in Emergencies for more). ↩︎
  7. Each household received roughly $244 in total, constrained by the size of our funding envelope. With a fixed budget, implementers often must decide whether to transfer more money to fewer households or transfer less money to more households — and in this case, we chose the latter. ↩︎
  8. Through the Building Resilient Communities in Somalia (BRCiS) consortium, funded by the UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO). ↩︎
  9. In original currency, EUR46 and EUR255 — flipping 0.8862 2025 exchange rate used here to be 1.1283 EUR to USD. ↩︎
  10. This type of model can also leave gaps in areas where no framework exists but climate shocks still occur. In Afghanistan, for example, the UN’s 2025 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan anticipatory action framework was limited to northern areas. ↩︎
  11. The six- month-long Turkana program set-up sounds lengthy but was actually quite quick by anticipatory action standards! ↩︎
  12. Cost savings from such an approach would come by assembling readiness from preexisting parts, though we can’t yet say whether this approach beats build and fuel on cost-effectiveness. ↩︎
  13. DG ECHO’s anticipatory funding reaches NGOs largely through pooled structures rather than direct grants. In 2024/25, the body commissioned a study whose objectives included analyzing ECHO’s legal and administrative frameworks and assessing the feasibility of a dedicated instrument to finance the fuel component of anticipatory action. ↩︎
  14. Pooled financing is where several donors contribute to a shared fund that disburses against agreed criteria, rather than each donor individually disbursing their own grants to implementers. ↩︎

Who gets to decide development policy?

In 1992, India amended its constitution to create some 250,000 elected village governments covering roughly 800 million people — the largest exercise in democratic decentralization in human history. The effects of this 73rd Amendment have varied enormously across states. In Kerala, an extraordinary People’s Campaign in 1996 created a system of nested participatory planning. Street-level groups deliberate on their needs, which are passed on to a ward-level assembly, then percolate upward to a village assembly where all expressed needs are prioritized and matched with budgets. Over the course of the year, the agreed-upon projects are implemented and monitored in active collaboration with citizens.

People discuss at a neighborhood meeting
Neighborhood meeting (Ward Sabha) in Kerala, 2003. Photo by Vijayendra Rao.

In other states, the same assemblies, created by the same amendment, are ceremonial rooms where nothing important is decided. In the 300 village-meeting transcripts that Paromita Sanyal and I analyzed for “Oral Democracy,” we found that differences in literacy, caste or wealth inequality did not explain how well these village assemblies worked. They were driven by whether the state government actually wanted decentralization to work – whether it devolved real money and real authority to the assemblies. The same constitutional amendment produced very divergent realities.

Woman stands at Gram Sabha
Gram Sabha in Tamil Nadu, 2012. Photo by Vijayendra Rao.

But understanding this divergence in the quality of deliberation has not been prioritized by mainstream economists and policymakers — because it would be a measure of process. Over the last century, the policy options on offer from economists for tackling poverty and inequality have overwhelmingly been focused on outcomes — resulting in what I call outcome-policies. 

An outcome-policy manipulates the levers of government — transfers, taxes, expenditures, regulations — to hit a target and is judged by whether it hits it. Conditional cash transfers are judged by whether children stay in school; estate taxes by whether they improve intergenerational mobility; health insurance by its effects on health and hardship. 

Outcome-policies are tied to metrics, which is much of their appeal. When the politics are favorable, they are relatively easy to enact by legislative or executive action. They are also easy to reverse.

A process-policy is a different animal. It tries to change how change happens: to equalize power in how decisions get made, each increment building on the last. Its proximate effects are subtle and hard to measure, and its full impact takes years to show. Precisely for those reasons, changes from process-policies tend to last longer than those from outcome-policies. Process policies change the machinery that produces outcomes rather than the outcomes themselves. Constitutionally protected deliberative bodies, participatory budgeting systems, adaptive systems of implementation — these are process-policies. 

In the essay that preceded this one, I argued that development economics research has built a wall between itself and the people it studies. Policy has the same distance problem that research does, but the stakes are higher, because policy can directly and substantially affect people’s lives at a scale that research cannot. The distance, though, is not just a matter of bad implementation. It is built into the frameworks we use to think about what policy is.

The Three Dominant Ways of Thinking About Policy

Policies for welfare, growth, inequality and poverty are conditioned by three broad paradigms, all mostly derived from economics.1 All three are outcome-oriented at heart.

The neoliberal paradigm starts from deep skepticism that social science can understand complex human interaction well enough to engineer a better world. So it falls back on first principles: laissez-faire markets, free trade, human rights, electoral democracy. Free markets deliver growth; elections keep governments honest. The proponents of this paradigm have some empirical evidence for this: over the long run, democracy may indeed cause growth, and there is evidence that growth is an important determinant of poverty reduction.

This is the view that underlay the Washington Consensus of the 1980s and 1990s. Its answer to poverty is to maximize growth and equalize access to human capital, and there is something to it — but the effect of growth on poverty depends on how unequal a place is to begin with, and there is strong reason to believe that neoliberal policies increase inequality and erode social support. This can be by, for instance, creating opportunity markets that commodify access to basic needs like education and housing. Also, note that the largest reduction in poverty happened in China, which is not a democracy and grew and reduced poverty by making policy adaptively and experimentally, adjusting as it went.

The deeper limitation of neoliberal policymaking is disciplinary. Rational-choice individualism has no comfortable place for social exclusion or cultural and political inequality, so every socially driven argument — for gender equality, for social cohesion — has to be smuggled in through a growth prism. (Hence the slew of 1990s papers arguing that women’s education is good for GDP.) Welfare gets measured in income and consumption and poverty becomes a line denominated in dollars and cents, and a large survey industry exists to determine it.

The neo-Keynesian paradigm is the counter. Markets fail — through externalities, information asymmetries, market power — and the social sciences can tell the state how to correct them. Growth still matters, but there is acute awareness that markets do not deliver basic services to the poor and that discrimination is systemic. Household surveys now collect data on gender, religion, race and caste; equality of opportunity is a stated goal, backed by law and affirmative action. 

The result is the intellectual justification for interventionist government — the London Consensus is the most recent comprehensive statement of this, with its slate of minimum wages, progressive property taxes and public investment in everything from infrastructure to nutrition. Along the way, the paradigm has developed a deep knowledge of government failure and clientelism. But even as it has sought to understand government failure, it does not seek to fix it through process. Instead, it builds on expert diagnoses by economists and social scientists — the state corrects, the citizen receives.

The third paradigm — neopaternalism2 — is arguably a more stringent extension of the second, and it has exploded in influence over the last two decades. It starts from the opposite end from neoliberalism: an abiding faith in the power of social science and data — behavioral experiments, randomized trials — to give direction to policy. 

It takes its cues from public health, with a firm commitment to “evidence-based” everything. Its behavioral foundation is the research on scarcity: the poor face such punishing constraints on time and attention that they are steered into suboptimal choices, so the freedom to choose means little when the ability to choose is itself constrained. That is the justification for the top-down push — the nudge — away from actions, norms and practices that the policymaker has determined are harmful.

I want to be fair to this world, because it is the one I have been surrounded by and worked in for decades, and its advantages are real. The trials generate vast amounts of data about the conditions of the poor, well beyond income and consumption. They create a culture in which policy has to be justified with evidence rather than hope or idealism. And they weed out the bad intervention ideas. 

But the disadvantages of this model of the world have been well catalogued, and two matter most here. 

The first is overreach: policy driven by the demands of scientific technique rather than technique driven by the needs of policy — the tail wagging the dog. If all evidence must pass through a randomized trial, interventions that cannot be randomized disappear from the menu. And because a good trial needs good implementation — a messy rollout contaminates the design — trials effectively assume away what Albert Hirschman argued 60 years ago is the central problem of development policy: the complicated process by which ideas become action on the ground. 

The second is context. An intervention that works in one place may fail in another. The randomizers’ answer is to run trials across many settings and at much larger scale, which works for simple interventions but breaks down for complex ones — the interventions tailored for, and especially by, communities, where designs vary too much for any sample to have adequate statistical power. 

So neopaternalism drifts, by the logic of its own tools, toward interventions that are simple, uniform and predictable. It is a paradigm far more comfortable with certainty than with reflexivity. Culture enters the analysis as a set of “traits” to be scored good or bad; the study of social life becomes part of the expert’s apparatus for nudging people toward welfare as the expert defines it. Nobody asks the poor what they want. And it is not a rhetorical flourish to say that. It is a fairly precise description of the method.

As I write, British and American aid budgets have been gutted, and two economists I respect — Rachel Glennerster and Dean Karlan, who served as chief economists of the two countries’ aid agencies — have jointly responded with a call for “radical simplification”: take what money is left and spend it on a short list of proven, cost-effective “smart buys” — malaria nets, nutrition supplements, structured lesson plans, cash transfers — at large scale, shorn of the complexity that makes programs “expensive to design, hard to manage, and almost impossible to evaluate.” They have a point, up to a point. 

Mission creep is real, and it is often driven by donors, as anyone who has watched a project buckle under the weight of a phalanx of consultants knows. Reducing mission creep and focusing on what you meant to do in the first place has value. But look at the third item on their charge sheet. “Almost impossible to evaluate” is a statement about the evaluator’s preferences and their expert-driven worldview; it prompts the question of “evaluable by whom?” 

When the menu of interventions is restricted to what a randomized trial can certify, it fills up with simple, uniform, predictable interventions, and the complex policies with subtle effects and unpredictable trajectories — which can displace the steady state and shift to a better development path — gradually fall off it. But many effective programs are not simple and they can take decades to bear fruit. Indeed, it would be impossible to price the net gain per unit. 

But consider who paid for these programs. The policy reforms of Kerala were not financed out of the bilateral aid budgets (now being gutted); they were political projects of Indian state governments, built (largely) with domestic money and domestic legitimacy. The principal financier of process-policy is (often) the national state, not the donor.

Radical simplification may be a good way to triage for shrunken bilateral aid budgets, but it can say much less about what governments and multilateral institutions should do with their own budgets. 

Seeing Like a Policymaker

Why do three paradigms that disagree about almost everything else converge on focusing on measurable outcomes? 

James Scott’s “Seeing Like a State” showed why: states can only govern what they can “see,” so they work hard to make society “legible” — standardized categories, uniform measures, administrative grids.

There is nothing inherently wrong with this. Without legibility, there is no taxation, no public health, no welfare state. But the categories are not just descriptions; they are instruments that remake the world in their own image. And what gets stripped out along the way is what Scott, borrowing from the Greeks, called métis (common sense). This is practical, local, experience-based knowledge, provided by those who know the area and the place.

His examples have become famous. German foresters replaced messy, diverse woodlands with neat rows of Norway spruce that could be counted and taxed. Brasília’s grid-based urban structure, shaped like an airplane, replaced the messy reality of settlements that grow organically.

Legibility is all over the policy world. A market price is legibility: it compresses a tangle of preferences and systems of production into a single number. A poverty line is a legible expression of poverty — which is a complex, multidimensional experience. Randomized control trials are also an exercise in legibility — making behavior legible by stripping away context and subjecting lives to a treatment variable.

None of the above paradigms disagree about legibility. They argue only about who should make the policy — the market, the ministry, the experimenter. 

And none of them ask the people, who are ostensibly the beneficiaries of the policy. The outcomes may be legible, but there is little effort to make them legible to those the policy affects. Seen from this angle, radical simplification is not radical at all — it is the neopaternalist paradigm’s default option made legible by a budget crisis. In some ways it represents a return to the expert-driven, top-down vision for policy that organizations like the World Bank were criticized for pushing on the world in the 1970s and 1980s.

Elections Are Not Enough

All three paradigms have the same problem — who checks the policymakers? All three paradigms also have the same answer: democratic electoral accountability.

Neoliberals and neo-Keynesians lean on universal franchise to keep governments aligned with citizens’ interests. Neopaternalism leans harder still: Cass Sunstein’s libertarian paternalism is explicitly premised on democratic constraints keeping the nudgers benign. 

But the electoral check is not perfect. Elite capture and clientelism are pervasive. Democratic backsliding is relatively common. And we now live in an age of surveillance capitalism, in which the capacity to track people with extremely precise data threatens to delegitimize democratic processes altogether. If the ballot box is the only check the three paradigms recognize, then as the ballot box weakens, so does the legitimacy of the entire policy edifice built on top of it.

Jeep used in an election campaign
Jeep used for a village council election campaign, Karnataka, 2003. Photo by Vijayendra Rao.

This is not a problem confined to poor countries. The question of who checks the policymakers is becoming urgent everywhere — from the United States to Hungary.

Meanwhile, civil society is not limited to the ballot box. Across the world, at every level, people have organized themselves into bodies that monitor power between elections — what John Keane calls monitory democracy: citizen committees, self-help groups, minipublics, social audits, watchdog NGOs. Such forums sometimes emerge organically, but they can also be created: development organizations have spent hundreds of billions of dollars inducing participation.3

These institutions exist even in authoritarian settings. In rural China, citizens’ groups working with sympathetic civil servants have built accountability without democracy inside systems of authoritarian deliberation. In other words: a paradigm of action that runs on process rather than outcomes already exists. It is time to give it a name and a description.

Reflexive Policy

I call the fourth paradigm reflexive policymaking. Reflexive is used in the sense the word carries in sociology and anthropology: a reflexive practice is one in which the professional treats the boundary between herself and the people affected as a problem to be worked on, not a wall to be maintained. 

The idea is a close cousin of Robert Goodin’s reflective democracy: an effective democracy has to cultivate its citizens’ capacity to “deliberate within,” to run other people’s situations through their own heads. Deliberating within is what makes cognitive empathy possible at all. The policy challenge is to produce it at scale: to redesign decision-making so that politicians, officials and citizens develop cognitive empathy for one another, horizontally and vertically.

Grand as that sounds, the practice is concrete, and pieces of it are operating all over the world. Four processes recur. 

The first fills in the blank space between elections with continuous dialogue between citizens and governments — deliberative systems anchored in some officially sanctioned civic space, a forum or a regularly scheduled public meeting, where an ordinary citizen can directly influence the decisions that bear on her life. Forums alone are not enough; they have to sit inside a culture of dialogue in which speaking and listening become everyday practice. That is what Kerala built, and its neighbors did not. 

The second equalizes power in decision-making directly, by giving voice to disadvantaged groups — and, more radically, by reserving seats for them, as India has done for women and lower castes in its village governments. Reservation is itself an admission that deliberation carries no automatic guarantee of equity — an all-male council can ignore women’s concerns, and a government run by upper castes may ignore the concerns of lower castes, no matter how many times they are brought before them.4

Process-based policy does not assume that people will always govern justly; rather, it claims that for a government to be legitimate, it must be more directly run by the governed. They are better placed than the experts to define the problems about which they have more information and are better placed to address them; having citizens determine foreign policy is obviously not optimal, but having them run local schools is.5

Indian woman at a desk
Village council president, Ujjire, Karnataka, 2003. Photo by Vijayendra Rao.

The third builds feedback loops, within government and between government and citizens, so that decision-making becomes adaptive: try, learn, adjust — instead of design, implement, evaluate, stop. 

The fourth uses technology to give people control over their own data, to strengthen collective action and equalize access to public services rather than to surveil. The current excitement about AI-mediated deliberation falls under this category too, with this caveat: use the machines to scale our ability to listen and learn, not substitute for it. 

The Sandwich

The capacity to participate is not something that communities alone can control. It is a political relationship spread across three layers. 

There has to be a responsive state at the top, with the political will to devolve real power and the fiscal capacity to back it with real money. There has to be a motivated and organized citizenry at the bottom — cohesive enough to act collectively and deliberative enough to work through disagreement. And there has to be a working middle: the district office, the field facilitator, the state ministry — an intermediary tier that translates citizens’ voice upward, and the state’s authority downward, thereby protecting local citizens from having their interests captured by local elites. Ghazala Mansuri and I, borrowing from Jonathan Fox, called this the “sandwich” in “Localizing Development.”

Every case of process-policy that works at scale has all three layers, and every visible failure has a hole in one of them. This is the pattern that Mansuri and I found in reviewing the evidence on participatory development, which has a large, mixed and often disappointing record. What was clear, however, was that the successes and failures could be explained — where the top was missing, participation degenerated into empty consultation, and the community meeting became a place for cheap talk. Where the bottom was thin, collective action became difficult to organize. Where the middle was broken — and in many countries the middle is the weakest layer — elite capture became much more likely and even well-designed policy harder to deliver. 

This, in retrospect, provides insight into why so much donor-induced participation has disappointed. Donors build the bottom — generally the cheap layer, the one you can deliver on a project cycle. But they skip the political work at the top and the institutional work in the middle. A sandwich with one layer is not a sandwich — and the whole thing fails.

Kerala, to return to the opening puzzle, is what it looks like when a state builds the whole sandwich. The People’s Campaign organized the bottom, while the ruling coalition supplied the political will and intellectual direction for the top layer. And it did one other thing: it staffed and funded the cadres in the middle. Participatory planning works in Kerala because the street-level groups feed into the ward-level assembly, which in turn informs the village assembly. Each layer of the sandwich is linked in a feedback loop with the others.

The sandwich applies everywhere. Indonesia’s Kecamatan Development Program (KDP) began in 1997 as a pilot in 48 villages, having been designed by the anthropologist Scott Guggenheim and colleagues in Bappenas, the Indonesian planning ministry. It grew out of an ethnographic study of how Indonesian villages organized themselves, which found that the culture of gotong royong (mutual assistance) in Indonesia created village-level institutions with a much greater capacity for durable collective action than the user groups that projects kept creating.

Mosque in Indonesia
Mosque built with gotong royong in Kalimantan, 2005. Photo by Vijayendra Rao.

Its design was not dissimilar to Kerala’s People’s Campaign. Block grants went directly from the central government to the kecamatan, the subdistrict. From the neighborhoods and hamlets up, villagers deliberated on proposals and sent a delegation of at least six representatives, three of them women, to an inter-village forum where they, drawing on gotong royong norms, deliberated and voted on which proposals to fund. Once the forum decided, nobody higher up could alter the decision. Facilitators recruited from NGOs and the private sector took the information and worked with village organizations to implement the agreed-upon plan, circumventing the village head’s tendency to capture such decisions. As Guggenheim puts it, the state’s job was to do less rather than more: keep the money moving, audit it and stay out of local decision-making.

That is the sandwich. Reform-minded bureaucrats in Bappenas and the Ministry of Finance at the top, with the World Bank supplying money and air cover. A tier of trained facilitators in the middle. And at the bottom, villages with long traditions of collective action and their own ways of managing and implementing a common fund. The layers of the sandwich held long enough for norms to shift. KDP reached 2,000 villages by 2002, 6,000 by 2006, when it was renamed PNPM Mandiri, and 60,000 by 2011. In 2014, Indonesia turned it into the Village Law, which made a block grant to all 75,000 villages a permanent entitlement in the national budget. A donor-supported experiment became a permanent part of the state.

Meanwhile, Brazil’s Porto Alegre is an example of the reverse. Its participatory budgeting was a celebrated case of citizens directly deciding how public money gets spent. But after the Workers’ Party (PT) lost the mayor’s office in 2004, the project was largely dismantled. The bottom was still there; the top lost interest, and the middle was rendered ineffective. This is why reflexive policy requires donors, organizers, politicians, bureaucrats and citizens working together long enough for norms and expectations to shift and reach a sustainable equilibrium.

A Revolution by Stealth

Consider Jeevika, the rural livelihoods program launched in 2006 in Bihar. The state was then, by almost any measure, the hardest place in India to attempt anything of the kind. Rural poverty stood at 55.7% against a national average of 41.8%. Per capita income was a third of the national average. Only 37% of women were literate, only 1% had access to microcredit and two-thirds of rural household loans came from moneylenders charging 100 to 200% a year.6 Alleviating rural poverty in this context would be a tall order. 

Furthermore, Bihar was a difficult, highly unequal, patriarchal and caste-ridden context. Into this, Jeevika introduced something deceptively modest: self-help groups (SHGs) of 10 to 15 women, meeting weekly to save and lend among themselves, subsequently federated into village organizations and cluster-level federations. Shruti Majumdar, Paromita Sanyal and I spent four years doing qualitative fieldwork (embedded with a randomized control trial that ran for 18 months) on how the project worked between 2010 and 2014. This fieldwork became our new book, “Revolution by Stealth”.

Jeevika offered cheap credit, insurance and income generation, with no language of women’s rights or resistance anywhere in sight.7 In a short period of 18 months, the program refinanced 28% of household debt into SHG loans that charged a much lower interest rate of 24%, undercutting the previously available interest rates by 150 percentage points or more. There were also “general equilibrium” effects — competition from Jeevika reduced the rate charged by moneylenders by 35%.

Jeevika did not present itself as a challenge to the local order. It did not name a villain. Its targets were two things: poverty and the moneylender. It explicitly brokered the acquiescence, if not the acceptance, of the village head (mukhiya) and the other local power brokers by offering the village a better life without creating a revolution. 

Women sitting in a circle
Women’s SHG, Muzaffarpur, Bihar, 2010. Photo by Vijayendra Rao.

The gender transformation came (much) later, and it came not from persuasion or an explicit effort to change norms, but from repeated practice that turned into ritual. Jeevika brought women together, regularly, in groups with rules. Week after week, they would meet, sing, save together; they’d lend to each other, deliberate, manage their accounts, bargain. Week after week, they’d meet. Participation built confidence and women’s voices. This repeated practice built radically new social roles and reworked relationships within households and communities.

As one bewildered male respondent quoted in our book put it: “(Chief Minister) Nitish (Kumar) has turned women into men.”

Indian man in a plastic chair
Village moneylender in Bihar, 2012. Photo by Shruti Majumdar.

That was the sandwich. The chief minister embraced Jeevika early and gave it sustained political protection from the top. It attracted the best young Indian Administrative Service (IAS) officers, professional staff and a network of facilitators to run the middle. And the didis themselves — the women of the SHGs, federated upward — became the organized bottom. 

Jeevika now reaches more than 14 million women in over a million SHGs across Bihar. It is part of a national program, which now serves some 86 million women across India. This is arguably the largest federation of women in the world.

There was some resistance, of course, and there still is. But over the four years we came to read the backlash differently: it is not a sign that things are failing; it is what change looks like when power and identity are being renegotiated. 

We also came to think differently about culture. It is not a set of cognitive biases to be nudged away. Culture can be changed, but it is a slow process; change requires protection from local elites and political interference.

Nothing about Jeevika looks like a radically simplified intervention. Almost everything about it is process-policy — no single outcome target, no lever pulled from the capital, just a rearrangement of when, how and how often people meet, who meets whom, who holds money and who gets to speak. And it produced cultural change in gender relations. Evaluations that revisited the original RCT sample almost 10 years later found that the program had caused 126% more low-caste women to run for political office and improved women’s ability to share risk, while radically transforming credit markets in one of the most patriarchal places on earth, on a timescale the standard paradigms would have said was impossible.

Doing by Learning

None of this is easy to do at scale, and much of it is not even easy to measure. That is rather the point, though. Process-policies shift trajectories in unpredictable ways, so evaluating them means watching processes move: how decisions get made, how power relations shift, how narratives and discourse change.

These things do not sit in administrative data and clean survey answers. They require qualitative work and narrative analysis coordinated with quantitative methods in genuinely mixed-method designs, which are not the norm in development economics.

For several years at the World Bank, colleagues and I tried to build this way of working into the machinery of Jeevika and its Tamil Nadu counterpart, through something we called the Social Observatory. 

The idea was to move researchers from being overqualified outsiders who fly in whenever a survey needs doing to something like the project’s own think tank, with the aim of improving implementation by creating a culture of doing-by-learning. A team of economists, sociologists, political scientists, public health specialists and data scientists embedded within the project helped build decision-support systems so that staff, from the village level up, could act on good, fast data. (This was instead of yet another management information system nobody paid attention to.) 

Qualitative process monitors visited a rotating random sample of villages every quarter and fed what they found back into design. Impact evaluations varied by how the answer would be used — quick impact evals when the project needed an answer soon, long mixed-method ones when it needed to understand outcomes and mechanisms.

The aim was to turn research from a tool for assessment into a tool for implementation. A paper that we originally wrote in 2015, drawing on the qualitative work, was critical of how the project’s second phase was being implemented, showing that the reflexive, co-produced process followed in the first phase was being neglected in the pursuit of higher enrollment numbers. The project responded with a concerted effort to give field staff more room to use their judgment. It improved the management information system and the process-monitoring system, strengthened the feedback loops between them and the facilitators, and created forums where facilitators could learn from and advise one another. The result was that facilitators moved away from an exclusive focus on the number of women enrolled toward a more adaptive and reflexive way of working with each village.

Policy, done this way, becomes constant adaptation rather than a one-shot deal. (Incidentally, this also protects against policy stasis: it kept the program responsive to changing conditions on the ground.)

What Would It Take To Do This? 

Now: the honest accounting of such policymaking. 

Reflexive policymaking requires very long time horizons. It is a “slow-cooked” way of doing policy, as opposed to the simple, easily scaled McDonaldization that pervades policy work. It requires a certain tolerance for mess, because reversing inequalities in power and agency is a contentious, uncertain business.

But the deepest obstacle to implementation of process-policies is that governments — and quasi-governments like the World Bank and donor agencies — are not set up for process-policies. The logic of bureaucracies, and of the political environments they answer to, pulls toward interventions that produce quick, measurable impact without threatening the status quo. Process-policies fail on all three counts: they are slow, they are hard to measure and they threaten the status quo more or less by definition.

Part of the problem may be how policy professionals are trained. (There are other equally important reasons.) Schools of public policy are generally staffed (with the occasional infusion of a “professor of practice”) by academics trained in economics or another social science discipline. Their knowledge of policy comes almost entirely from bringing academic expertise to implementers who choose to seek their advice, not from being embedded in the world of policy. So the courses that policy schools teach are, for the most part, variants of academic economics or political science, subject to the same fads as the academic departments and to the same pathology of belief: that to be a good policymaker you have to be an academically gifted expert immersed in the latest techniques and theories. There are very few courses that teach you how to sit through a village meeting, and only a small minority focus on the nitty-gritty of process issues.8

In practice, there is already some process-policy in place. Almost all policy in any country involves some amount of all four paradigms. Markets do coordinate dispersed knowledge; states do correct market failures; evidence can improve design. My claim is not that reflexive policymaking should replace all other types of policymaking. Rather, it is narrower: the three dominant paradigms would all benefit from more reflexivity. Reflexivity is neglected precisely because it is hard to measure, and in the current policy culture, what is hard to measure gets treated as unserious.

Process-policies mostly come into the world through years of unglamorous effort by activists working at a small scale in social movements and NGOs. Given what is happening to democratic institutions, and to inequality, it is time to bring them into the mainstream of the policy craft.

In concrete terms, every large program should budget for embedded learning. The structure of that learning should not be determined in advance; it should be process-oriented. It also does not suffice to only do randomized trials that give us a measure of outcome at the end of the project cycle.

Donors must also fund the middle tier — the facilitators, the district staff, the connective tissue — instead of mobilizing communities and walking away. Projects should be given time to evolve and adapt rather than be judged on whether they follow a predetermined trajectory of change. And schools of public policy should require — alongside the econometrics sequence — that their graduates actually spend time in the places where they will likely work. None of this is impossible, or even particularly difficult, to do. It is merely beyond current practices.

Whose policy counts? The three dominant paradigms answer, in effect: the market’s, the ministry’s, the expert’s. The people the policy is for appear as consumers, recipients and subjects, respectively; they are not shapers of policy.

There may be a different answer. Policy counts when the people it is meant to serve can shape it, contest it and correct it — when the woman who was dragged out of my focus group in Karnataka, whom I described in my previous essay, has somewhere to take what she knows. Research that does not listen produces papers about a world it has not understood. Policy that does not listen produces programs that are neither tailored to people’s needs nor able to adapt across place and time. Policy that listens can shift the political, social and cultural equilibrium — and that is what makes change last.

Cartoon about a build your own sandwich bar vs. a vending machine

Vijayendra Rao is a development economist who combines econometric methods with ethnography. He spent 27 years as a Lead Economist in the Development Research Group at the World Bank and is currently the Roberta Buffett Distinguished Scholar-Practitioner in Residence at Northwestern University and Distinguished University Fellow at National Law School of India University. His interests include gender, culture, participation, deliberative democracy, political economy and innovations in mixed methods. His latest book, “Revolution by Stealth: How Women’s Groups Catalyzed a Cultural Transformation in Bihar” (with Shruti Majumdar and Paromita Sanyal), was published by Cambridge University Press in 2026.

If you have comments on this article or wish to contribute to the discussion, please email letters@indevelopmentmag.com. Responses will be featured in a letters section.

  1. These are “ideal types” and may blur into each other in practice. ↩︎
  2. To quote Thaler and Sunstein, “a policy counts as ‘paternalistic’ if it is selected with the goal of influencing the choices of affected parties in a way that will make those parties better off.” ↩︎
  3. With admittedly mixed results. ↩︎
  4. There is a very large (and growing) literature on women’s and caste reservations in India that show that they are — on balance — equalizing both on policy choices and deliberation. This paper summarizes the literature. ↩︎
  5. Decision-making should, as much as is within the realm of feasibility, follow the principle of subsidiarity: “central authorities should perform only those tasks which cannot be performed effectively at a more intermediate or local level.” ↩︎
  6. See the first chapter of Revolution By Stealth for citations and broader discussion on conditions in Bihar in 2006. ↩︎
  7. Women’s SHG programs in India are government-run non-profits that should not be confused with microcredit or microfinance programs. As we document in Revolution by Stealth, group-based credit and savings are just the start, used as an initial incentive to develop a federated community of women — running into the millions — creating women’s social capital that is in turn used as a platform to run all manners of “vertical” interventions including nutrition, health, schooling, food security and income generation. ↩︎
  8. Some notable exceptions are courses taught by Matt Andrews, Erica Chenoweth, Archon Fung and Marshall Ganz at the Kennedy School, and Dan Honig at Georgetown’s McCourt School. ↩︎

Pain control is often treated as a luxury, leaving millions in low- and middle-income countries to suffer needlessly.

Dr. M.R. Rajagopal is haunted by the memory of his cousin’s nightly cries echoing through his village. His cousin had no pain relief for flare-ups from a rare skin cancer on his scalp, which caused him immense pain. And his cousin was not the only person he was unable to help; his memoir details other occasions he was unable to do more for people in his care. In his early career, he was too cautious in administering morphine — an opioid — to a man who had burns on 70% of his body; he was afraid of creating an addict. For months, his patient was kept in agony with only a few hours of daily pain relief. Years later, the man bumped into Rajagopal and told him the ordeal almost destroyed him. Rajagopal was shattered — but the experience changed his approach to pain forever. Dr. Rajagopal went on to become a pioneer in modern Indian palliative medicine.1

These anecdotes are from more than 40 years ago, but the patterns are hardly a thing of the past. Across rich and poor countries alike, people are still routinely failed through a lack of access to proper pain relief.2

Having no access to pain relief can be agonizing. Cancer patients in Vietnam describe waiting for others to die so that they could get the leftover morphine. Kenyan patients speak of their wish to hasten their deaths due to their inability to find peace from pain. I experienced uncontrolled and agonizing pain myself when, as a child in Uruguay, I had second-degree burns on both legs. Without appropriate pain relief, my pain was more than just physical. As I counted down the hours to the next dressing change, the anxiety I experienced was just as distressing and memorable as the deep burn of the gauze coming unstuck from my raw flesh.

Some form of suffering is a core experience for most of us around the world. Depending on the country and survey, between 5% and 10% of people from the UK, US and Middle East report having pain that impedes their daily functioning. More than two-thirds of advanced cancer patients have serious pain, and recent estimates suggest over 70 million people endure at least one day of serious health-related suffering a year.3

As populations grow older and we make gains against communicable disease, the burden of disease is shifting to chronic diseases like cancers and other diseases of old age, which can be painful and long-lasting. In much of the world, where people still can’t access good-quality healthcare, many conditions that are easily treatable remain serious causes of pain. We need better systems to help people deal with pain and death in a dignified way.

From Plants to Pills

For as long as we’ve been able to feel pain, we’ve tried to soothe it. Plants have been our best friends in this effort. The oldest evidence of plants being used as analgesics dates back at least 5,000 years. The poppy (Papaver somniferum) features prominently in history, with Sumerians using milk of the poppy as early as 4000 B.C. Egyptian texts dating back to 1500 B.C. also describe using poppies for pain relief. Opium comes from poppies — it is the dried latex from its seed pods. Its potent pain relief qualities made it central to trade — and, later, wars. In 1806, a few decades before the First Opium War, the German pharmacist Friedrich Sertürner would isolate a key compound from opium. This compound would be marketed as morphine, after Morpheus, the ancient Greek god of dreams. 

Willow was also used as pain relief, appearing in the historical record at around the same time as milk of the poppy. Later, researchers would modify some of the compounds found in willow and market the resulting drug as aspirin around 1899.4 By 1950, it would be the most frequently sold painkiller. Heroin was introduced about the same time as aspirin, and was initially touted by Bayer as the non-addictive alternative to morphine — a claim that quickly fell apart. 

Later drugs have increased our capacity to manage pain — paracetamol and ibuprofen are among the most recent of the commonly used pain relief drugs, entering commercial circulation in the 1950s and 1960s. Each new drug has expanded our pain treatment repertoire — some drugs work well for cancer pain, some for acute trauma and others for childbirth.

These drugs and our evolving scientific understanding have dramatically improved our ability to treat pain. Opioids are particularly helpful for cancer pain; the UK’s National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) suggests that pain is difficult to control in just 10% of advanced cancer patients — for the vast majority, there are actionable steps that can be taken to alleviate their suffering.5

Cartoon showing a road made of spikes with a boot next to it

But in other corners of the world, patients with painful conditions remain woefully underserved. The standard of care in low-resource settings is worlds apart from what we would call ideal treatment. Estimates from 2020 showed that 84% of the world’s population lived in countries where opioid medications for pain control were not readily available. There is little hope of matching the type of pain to the best medication for that type of pain; across secondary and tertiary hospitals in Gombe, a rural Nigerian state, clinicians report having to use paracetamol and ibuprofen for all pain relief, including automobile accidents and even childbirth.6

For the Few, Not the Many 

In some settings, suffering from a painful medical condition can be like a sentence to ongoing torture. This torture is far more common in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) than in rich ones. 99% of children with serious health-related suffering are in LMICs. The lack of treatment for pain is especially common for the most severe types of pain, such as postsurgical and cancer pain. In Haiti, for instance, 99% of severe pain relief needs are unmet.7

Worldwide, the top 10% of countries by opioid consumption consume as much as 90% of all distributed opioids (converted into doses with the potency of morphine).

Chart showing the ratio of world population to percentage of global morphine consumption
Wealthy countries are much more likely to prescribe pain control than poorer ones.

To put this into perspective, one paper estimates that the average yearly controlled opioid consumption is 32 mg per person worldwide, but Germans consume around 480 mg per person. Note that this is not due to Germans overconsuming opioids; it is simply that pain elsewhere is not treated.

Chart showing countries' need for morphine and how much need is met
In many low- and middle-income countries, much need for pain control remains unmet.

Many issues in global health and development can be boiled down to lack of money, but the lack of pain control is not one of them. Morphine is among the cheapest essential medicines out there; oral morphine for 10 days costs about the same as a loaf of bread. Instead, lack of pain management is driven by a fear of opioids’ side effects, accentuated by the opioid epidemic in the United States and the closely related War on Drugs.

Traditionally, clinicians have avoided using opioids as much as possible, as they can cause central nervous system depression. This reduces the rate of breathing and in doing so could potentially hasten death. As recently as 2012, a third of medical ethics educators in the United States believed this to be the case. However, while it is true that morphine and other opioids have a narrow therapeutic index, meaning that the safety margin for their use is fairly small, it is not true that they hasten death when correctly administered.

Doctors’ fears of overusing opioids have only increased with time. Opioids are addictive, and overuse is dangerous. The United States has experienced significant public health harm from the overprescription of opioids, with the opioid crisis peaking at perhaps 80,000 opioid-caused deaths per year. The start of the crisis was caused by the unscrupulous drug pushing of pharmaceutical companies for types of pain where opioids are not very helpful. In response, doctors became much more hesitant to prescribe. Indeed, doctors could even be prosecuted for overprescription.

But while this first wave of the opioid crisis in the U.S. was driven by the prescribing dynamics of doctors, this was not the lasting mechanism for increased opioid deaths into the 2020s. Between 2011 and 2021, opioid deaths tripled, even as opioid prescriptions decreased by nearly 40% during the same period. Pain medication might have kicked off the epidemic, but it was not the lasting driver.

Chart showing opioid prescriptions vs deaths in the US
While the US opioid crisis was triggered by overprescription, deaths did not decline as prescriptions did.

Still, fear of overusing pain medication became widespread. Some Iranian patients conceptualize their pain as divine intervention, while many other patients fear that relieving their pain would leave them addicted to the analgesics on offer. In Rajagopal’s own state of Kerala, doctors report that patients often reject palliative medicine. Fear, rather than cost-benefit analysis, drives medical decision-making.

It is true that prescribing opioid pain medications comes with risks. Estimates of the true rate of opioid use disorder as a consequence of prescribing are very heterogeneous. One study has estimated the prevalence of problematic pharmaceutical opioid use at 9.3% in patients with non-cancer pain, while other studies estimated the risk as 0.2% for individuals with no preexisting addiction issues. Even a 0.2% risk of addiction is not trivial, but it must be weighed against the harm of leaving patients in debilitating pain.

Crucially, opioid pain medication must be treated like all other possibly addictive pain medications — worth the risk in some circumstances, but not in others. Different cases require different approaches. And when opioids are used in end-of-life settings, there are fewer concerns about addiction — if a patient is dying, even addiction might be a reasonable choice to make the last few months of their life more bearable. 

But despite these nuances, over time, regulation has tended to tighten restrictions on pain relief, further constraining who can access relief. 

Restrictions begin at the international level. Countries must report their need for opiates to the International Narcotics Control Board before importing them. Unfortunately, countries often underestimate their own needs for opioids and fear being seen as lax on drug control. Thus, they rarely choose to deviate from their current level of imports — even if it is far too low. Furthermore, since pain medication is not seen as “lifesaving,” it is an easy place for governments to cut corners.

Prescribers are also severely limited. It is not uncommon for certain frontline practitioners who have prescribing powers, such as nurses, to not be allowed to prescribe strong pain relief. In such scenarios, it is a blanket ban — and not clinical judgment — that drives care.

The fear of diversion also often means clinicians can’t carry pain relief to the last mile. Instead, patients must go to a central medical store for pickup. In some areas, this can mean that patients in severe pain must travel for hours to get medication. In countries where there’s no access at the last mile — for instance Malawi, where rural clinics can’t stock strong pain relief — this can further increase the difficulty in obtaining proper medication, requiring people to travel for days to access care.

The pendulum on accessing opioids is starting to swing back now; the International Narcotics Control Board has acknowledged its overzealousness in cautioning against the use of opioids. Decades of regulations are difficult to untangle, though, and have lasting effects on clinical practice.8

In many countries, the bureaucratic procedures one must follow to prescribe opioids remain difficult to navigate, too few clinicians are allowed to prescribe and updates in regulation take too long to trickle down to clinical practice. 

Instead, clinicians lean heavily on ibuprofen and paracetamol. However, these medications are only suitable for fairly mild pain; for postsurgical pain and cancer pain, they barely make a dent.

Most Suffering Is Unnecessary

When medication makes it to the patient, alleviating suffering can be relatively straightforward. Dr. Anne Merriman, another well-known name in the field of palliative care, set up Hospice Africa Uganda (HAU) in 1993. She wanted to establish a community hospice service that would distribute oral morphine to palliative care patients.

Initially, this goal seemed impossible. When HAU was founded, it was not even legal to import powdered morphine. Merriman’s first win was lobbying the Ugandan government to allow the importation of powdered morphine.

Reconstitution of powdered morphine for administration is relatively simple; according to Merriman, it is “easier than baking a cake”. All it takes is powdered morphine, little bottles, a preservative and some food coloring to mark the strength of the resulting solution. And it is extremely cheap, meaning that enough morphine to support pain relief for a day can cost less than a dollar. By 2025, when Merriman passed away at the age of 90, HAU had treated tens of thousands of patients and trained close to 10,000 clinicians across Africa to reconstitute and administer morphine.

Alongside its direct work, HAU continued to lobby the Ugandan government to improve access to pain control through policy change. In 2002, Uganda became the first African country to allow nurses to prescribe opioids. In 2010, the Ugandan government agreed to foot the bill for all supplies of oral morphine. 

timeline of palliative care in Uganda
Uganda has improved access to palliative care over the last several decades.

Production also continued to improve. Those who were making the oral morphine in a kitchen sink in the early 1990s would have been shocked to know that today HAU has an automated morphine production unit that supplies all accredited Ugandan medical facilities.

Palliative care would also become a stronger part of the medical agenda in Uganda. Policies such as task-shifting, community outreach and setting up production units seemed to work well for Ugandan patients and would become a blueprint for other countries in the region. In 2023, HAU’s Institute of Hospice and Palliative Care in Africa had its first cohort of master’s students graduate. 

Certainly, these low-tech solutions to plug opioid gaps are less interesting to pharmaceutical companies and philanthropists than developing new (and more profitable) drugs. But for decades, the medication development pipeline hasn’t produced much of note. Many efforts to work on specific “analgesic targets” other than mu-opioid receptors9 failed to deliver any results. The new drugs that have come on the market have often been developed for other ends and then repurposed, with little progress on purpose-developed non-opioid medications.10 Physicians have been stuck with opioids and a few non-opioid drugs — usually significantly less powerful than opioids — for pain management.

What Would It Take to Prioritize Pain? 

Even in countries with excellent medication availability, progress in palliative care is often stuck for deeply human reasons: misconceptions, regulation, governance and lack of training. The barrier to good care is not medicine innovation but rather the lack of prioritization of pain control as a key part of treatment. Moreover, we need to change how people conceptualize palliative care. It is viewed as reserved for frail and dying people, which is perhaps why in the United States fewer than one in five young adults with advanced cancer get appropriate palliative care as part of their treatment.

Worldwide, most clinicians are still not properly trained in pain management and pain management specialists are very rare. Mozambique, a country of 35 million people, has just two physicians specializing in pain management. Zimbabwe, a country of 17 million people, has just two pain specialists. Pain management is often viewed as unimportant.

Unlike more easily measured conditions and health states, pain is difficult to quantify and measure due to its subjectivity. For philanthropies and policymakers, then, it can be difficult to make a case for grants to reduce pain. This is not helped by the fact that modern medicine tends to focus on cures rather than relief of symptoms, ignoring how much the latter can improve quality of life, even if the underlying disease is unchanged.

But properly managing pain can make a huge difference in quality of life. When my mother-in-law, a former nurse, was dying from amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) in Jamaica, she suffered debilitating pain from the disease’s effects on her nerves and muscles. Our entire focus became making her days (slightly) more comfortable. It took a long time to find doctors and nurses who’d prioritize her comfort and symptom management, but once we did, it was transformative. I will always remember how at peace she felt when she was finally in the hands of competent and caring professionals. We treasured that time; when she was able to relax in this way, she shared jokes and laughs with all of us. Other families deserve the same level of care, and the chance to find moments of joy with their loved ones.

To make this happen, identifying the right gaps at the national, subnational and bedside levels will be key. In some settings, the most pressing need will be addressing supply chain breakdowns for opiates; in others, it will be undoing aggressive scheduling and regulatory restrictions.

It likely won’t be that expensive, though. It would cost just $1 million to provide pain control to all the children in low-income countries who need palliative care; perhaps $150 million for enough morphine to reach all the patients who need it. Per capita, universal palliative care in lower-middle-income countries would cost under $1 per year. This is a very small amount and would be relatively easy for governments to cover, but the challenge of relieving pain remains deeply neglected by policymakers. 

At the local level, some religious and charitable organizations provide places of respite for a handful of terminally ill people. Internationally, just a few organizations work on coordination and education. The problem’s multifaceted nature and resistance to being easily quantified should not detract from the need to increase funding and renew efforts to improve clinical attention to pain.

Progress will take time, as Rajagopal would come to understand as he sought to expand palliative care across India. But change is possible: in the more than three decades since Rajagopal started campaigning for better palliative care, his organization has made significant progress, including helping to amend the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act for better access to pain treatment. Kerala, the state where Rajagopal practices, has essentially eliminated morphine stockouts. Other countries can make the same progress.

We should not condemn hundreds of millions to suffer; we must treat pain as seriously as we treat disease.

Morgan Fairless is Research Director at Ambitious Impact, a charity incubator. His team identifies and prioritises high-impact charity ideas across global health and development and animal welfare. His writing focuses on underappreciated issues affecting low- and middle-income countries.

If you have comments on this article, or wish to contribute to the discussion, please email them to letters@indevelopmentmag.com. Responses will be featured in a letters section.

  1. Rajagopal co-founded Pallium India and helped establish other palliative care centers. His efforts in palliative care have shaped policies affecting millions across Kerala and India as a whole. The modern field of palliative medicine itself only took its first steps in 1967 with the creation of St. Christopher’s Hospice in South London; when Rajagopal started his medical career in the 70s, the World Health Organization analgesic ladder — commonly used as a tool to teach clinicians how to address pain and breakthrough pain with escalating strength of medication — did not exist. It would not be introduced until 1986. ↩︎
  2. The International Association for the Study of Pain defines pain as “an unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with, or resembling that associated with, actual or potential tissue damage.” This consensus definition, which had previously remained unchanged for over three decades, now acknowledges that pain is not simply a measure of physical damage. Like all feelings and perceptions, pain is a complex experience produced by the mind. Nociceptors provide information to the brain, but that information is not pain in itself. The brain will take those stimuli and integrate them with context, memories and expectations to produce the experience of pain. ↩︎
  3. This is calculated using a set of conditions that cause pain and IHME’s Global Burden of Disease. As such, these could be a substantial underestimate if the set of conditions is not complete. ↩︎
  4. Aspirin would turn out to be the gift that keeps on giving. Due to its antiplatelet properties, it has turned out to be highly useful to prevent and treat some cardiovascular conditions. Nowadays, aspirin is a mainstay of preventative medicine. ↩︎
  5. In London last year, I was awestruck as I witnessed my wife cheerfully rank every opiate pain medication she’d been given in her palliative cancer care (her drug of choice was oxycodone, while fentanyl remains “overrated”). ↩︎
  6. I learned this through interviews with clinicians in a recent visit. ↩︎
  7. As per Knaul et al. 2018, “the amount of morphine-equivalent opioids distributed in Haiti is 5 mg per patient in need of palliative care per year, which means that more than 99% of need goes unmet.” ↩︎
  8. Prescription rules are particularly constraining in settings with few doctors or specialists. If nurses or other professionals are not allowed to prescribe, it can take too long to get a prescription set up. Changes in prescription rules interplay with professional identity and pride. In Malawi, updates to allow nurses to prescribe opiates were not initially adopted by the college of nurses. ↩︎
  9. The target of opioid medications. ↩︎
  10. There has been a recent bright spot – in January 2025, the FDA approved suzetrigine (Journavx). It is a first-in-class non-opioid drug. However, it is suitable only for acute pain and costs around $15/pill. ↩︎

In Development and Asterisk are running an essay contest on how transformative AI will affect low- and middle-income countries.

AI is a transformative technology. To date, though, there has been relatively little exploration of what advanced AI will mean for developing countries.

In Development and Asterisk are running an essay contest on how transformative AI will affect low- and middle-income countries, and how they might respond. Essays may focus on a particular country, region, or group of countries, and should be between 2,000 and 5,000 words. We are particularly keen to see submissions from authors based in low- and middle-income countries.

Please feel free to submit on the relevant topic of your choice. Potential topics could include, but are certainly not limited to:

  • How will AI drive convergence or divergence between rich countries and developing countries?
  • What will be the labor market impacts of AI in a particular country? Which sectors will expand and which will contract?
  • How will AI change the political economy of the developing world?
  • How will governments likely use AI, for good or ill?
  • What policies are needed for low- and middle-income country governments to prepare for a transformative AI scenario? What capabilities would be needed to enact and maintain these policies?
  • How will AI affect conflict in low- and middle-income countries?
  • What are the primary barriers to the diffusion of AI-based health technologies and how can these barriers be reduced?
  • How do people in low- and middle-income countries currently view the relative benefits and risks of AI?
  • How might AI interact with the social fabric of low- and middle-income countries in ways that are underreported and/or differ from what we would see in the Global North?
  • Where should philanthropic funding from AI companies and employees go to accelerate development? Are there particularly promising AI-specific opportunities?

Some responses to transformative AI may already be sensible development policies. Essays discussing these policies should explain how AI changes their importance, urgency, or design.

We’re looking for essays that are deeply researched and contain original analysis. Reporting is encouraged but not necessary. All selected essays will be fact-checked and edited before publication.

Some of our favorite essays on these topics include Tomorrow’s AI Won’t Meet Today’s World by Oliver Hanney and Oliver Kim, The Staggering Welfare Consequences of Catch-up Growth After AI by Rafael Proença, Boarding China’s Last Bus by Zilan Qian, and AI Could Keep Countries Poor by Deena Mousa. Some of these were written by members of our judging panel or published in Asterisk; we include them to illustrate the kind of work we’re looking for, not the conclusions we expect.

Prizes:

Winner (1): $10,000 per essay + publication in both Asterisk (print and online) and In Development

Runner-Ups (2): $5,000 per essay + publication in both Asterisk (online) and In Development

Honorable Mentions (2): $2,000 per essay

Separately, the African Tech Futures Lab offers $2,500 for the best essay by an African national. This reflects their aim that Africans help define the future of the technology. This prize can be combined with the above prizes; thus, if the overall winner is an African national, they would receive $12,500.

AI policy:

You can use AI to research, to translate an essay written in a language other than English, and for feedback on your essay. However, we do not accept submissions that include AI-generated content beyond translation.

Rules and submissions:

  • Essays should be in English.
  • Pieces can be co-authored.
  • Each person may appear on only one entry, whether as a sole author or a co-author.
  • Entries must be previously unpublished (including on personal blogs or newsletters).

To submit: please fill out this form. Submissions close December 31, 2026 11:59 PM Anywhere on Earth.

If you have additional questions, please email essaycontest@indevelopmentmag.com.

The contest will be judged by:

Clara Collier

Clara Collier is the editor in chief of Asterisk Magazine, “the little magazine of the San Francisco Bay Area”. She holds an MA from Oxford University and a BA from Yale University.

Lauren Gilbert

Lauren Gilbert is the editor in chief of In Development and a non-resident fellow at the Centre for British Progress and the Energy for Growth Hub. Her writing has appeared in The Economist, Foreign Policy, The Washington Post, Works in Progress, and Asterisk. She previously worked as a program manager at Renaissance Philanthropy, a research fellow at Open Philanthropy, and a theoretical neutrino astrophysicist.

Oliver Hanney

Oliver Hanney is a contributing editor at In Development and the Managing Editor at VoxDev, a platform which features the latest research in development economics through articles, blogs, podcasts, videos, and living literature reviews (VoxDevLits). He hosts the weekly Ideas in Development podcast, and is particularly interested in AI, growth, and how research shapes policy.

Shahrukh Wani

Shahrukh Wani is Head of AI Policy Partnerships at the International Growth Centre (IGC) at the LSE, where he leads work to help LMIC governments use AI in policymaking and public services. Over the past decade, he has worked with governments in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uganda, Rwanda, Ethiopia and Zambia on policy reforms. Born and raised in Pakistan, he now lives in London.

Deena Mousa

Deena Mousa is a Program Officer at Coefficient Giving, where she leads its work on AI for global health and economic development. She also writes for outlets like The Economist, National Geographic, and Scientific American, and authors Under Development, a newsletter on emerging technology and global development. She holds a BA in Ethics, Politics, and Economics from Yale.

Joseph Levine

Joseph Levine is a development economist researching the societal impacts of transformative AI at Google DeepMind. He is also completing his DPhil in the economics department at the University of Oxford, focusing on public and welfare economics. Before starting his PhD, he consulted on technology policy and financing in the space industry.

Rose Mutiso

Rose M. Mutiso is the Founder and Executive Director of the African Tech Futures Lab. She is also the co-founder and former CEO of the Mawazo (“Ideas”) Institute. Previously, she served as the Research Director of the Energy for Growth Hub, and as a Senior Fellow focused on energy and innovation policy in the U.S. Department of Energy and U.S. Senate. She currently holds joint appointments as Science Advisor to the Energy for Growth Hub and Senior Fellow of the Conceptual Investigations Unit at Stanford University.

Rafael Cariello

Rafael Cariello is the managing editor of In Development. He has worked as a reporter and editor for Folha de S.Paulo, Brazil’s largest newspaper, and for piauí, its leading long-form magazine. Rafael holds a BA in History and a PhD in Economics from the University of São Paulo. Born in Rio, he is based in São Paulo.

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